The Eye Test: An Autopsy of the DeShaun Foster Era Following UCLA's 35-10 Loss to New Mexico

You'll be surprised by the grades UCLA received for this one!

Sep 25, 2025

The UCLA defense, likely 10 yards downfield. (Photo credit: uclabruins.com)

This Eye Test is going to be a little different, and I will be upfront with you here: this might be the last Eye Test of the season. Now, don’t get anything twisted - I’m not leaving or anything like that - but one of the core ideas of the Eye Test was that we used it to grade how the football team looked on a week-to-week basis, judging the improvement over time to help come to a conclusion on how the program in general is doing and whether the coaching staff should keep their jobs or not.

All of that goes out the window when you lose to New Mexico so badly that it gets your head coach fired.

So you should know off the rip that I don’t have any grade breakdowns for you here; when you lose by 25 to a team you were favored to beat by 14.5, you aren’t getting any grade above an F unless you are the special teams unit, which was blameless and only gets a C because they really did not look good in the return game. UCLA has made this article redundant by firing DeShaun Foster. Defensive coordinator Ikaika Malloe is also gone, reportedly feeling that Foster’s dismissal was his fault. UCLA did not make this change to salvage the current season, but to set itself up for future success; it is the first time since I’ve been alive where UCLA took decisive action rather than let the string play out on a failed coaching regime.

No, today’s Eye Test is mostly going to be an autopsy of why the DeShaun Foster regime failed. To be fair, Foster is not the sole reason for UCLA’s current state; the accounting of how we got to this point would take multiple articles (and honestly, that may be what the Eye Test transitions into being in the coming weeks). However, Foster is largely culpable for the current state of affairs at UCLA, and thus, the article will focus on his role in this disaster.

The DeShaun Foster Era ended at UCLA for two reasons: a failure to acquire talent and a failure to create interest in the program. These two reasons are something of a chicken-or-egg conundrum, but Foster could not find a way to be successful in either capacity. The rushed and suboptimal nature of his hiring - done in February, a few days after Chip Kelly left the program in an attempt to keep as much of the roster intact as possible - did not help matters, but the current landscape of college football is filled with coaches who were able to turn a program around in a year or two. In this new world, coaches do not have the luxury of a slow build, and especially at the Power Four level, there is no place for learning on the job.

I don’t know how much detail I need to go on the talent portion of Foster’s failures considering you’ve all watched the games, but it is important to note why this is happening. UCLA’s NIL operations are in shambles, with the Bruins featuring one of the worst-performing collectives in the Power Four conferences. In football, anyway - for basketball, Mick Cronin and Cori Close have both done a good job of building up Men of Westwood/Champions of Westwood, and are operating with top 15 budgets in their respective sports. DeShaun Foster did not put in the necessary work to build his NIL budget, instead following in the footsteps of his predecessor Chip Kelly in hoping that a fix would arrive. Revenue sharing is a salve, but only a minor one, as any college insider worth their salt will tell you that NIL and collectives are not going away, and that any school serious about football will still require a robust NIL operation to supplement their rev share money.

The end result is that UCLA did not have the money for top-end prospects. UCLA was not bringing in a transfer portal class loaded with experience because they could not afford to; instead, as Brandon Huffman of 247Sports explained on his West of the Rest podcast, UCLA was forced into a “Moneyball” situation, bringing in a host of talent that had failed to produce at the collegiate level but came from established programs, with the hope that a change of scenery would unlock their potential. Even Nico Iamaleava, UCLA’s highly-touted transfer quarterback, came at a steep discount thanks to the nature of his transfer - instead of receiving $2 million at Tennessee this year (or the $4 million his handlers were allegedly asking for), Iamaleava is reportedly getting around $1.2 million from UCLA. Most of the team is not getting near that much, which makes sense when you’re taking as many gambles as the coaching staff did.

But there are ways to gamble correctly, which UCLA failed to do. One of the things a team should look for when judging transfer quality is whether they have produced at the college level, and UCLA took a gamble on too many players that failed to see the field at their last stop. There were a few cases where you could look at a player and rationalize their lack of playing time with how good the program they came from was, but more often UCLA grabbed guys who sat for 2-3 years and rarely saw the field. Getting this kind of lottery ticket a few times is fine, but making it your primary strategy instead of grabbing a few players that had produced is a major problem, leaving UCLA with a team full of guys in their second or third years that still look like freshmen.

Line play in particular was a problem under Foster, which always seems to be an indicator of a poorly-constructed roster. On the offensive line, UCLA’s inability to identify and develop linemen stretches back to the Kelly era, but at least he was able to scheme around those deficiencies. Foster’s offensive line remains incompetent, but with schemes that do not seem to adjust for talent gaps. I will say that I’ve reconsidered what I wrote this past offseason regarding offensive line recruitment, as I’ve seen enough evidence to state you can effectively build a line through the portal, which cuts against the trope that coaches need more time to effectively build a line (and it wasn’t as though Foster was focused on that anyway - he only had two high school offensive linemen in his first full class, and only one in this current recruiting period). For the defensive line, UCLA never truly solved their edge problem, which is one area where I think you are more than ok spending NIL money on to get some good options. Throw in an interior defensive line that was relying on injured players recovering their form, and you have a recipe for disaster.

Talent acquisition has been a major problem, but it is compounded by a failure of self-assessment. This UCLA coaching staff was very high on the talent they had brought in this year; we know this because most of the beat writers had to rely on secondhand accounts from people inside the program regarding which players looked good, since the media itself was frozen out of practice and could not watch the players. That failure was laid bare by Utah in the opening game, then by UNLV and New Mexico right after. This wasn’t a situation like the previous year where you could rationalize the early-season losses because the opponents were good - Indiana, Oregon, and Penn State were playoff teams, LSU was LSU, etc. - because the teams UCLA lost to were not world-beaters. Utah just got blown out at home by Texas Tech, UNLV is a middle-of-the-road G5 team, and New Mexico lost the vast majority of its roster and had to rebuild on the fly.

New Mexico in particular laid bare all the problems with DeShaun Foster’s approach to the roster. Again, this team was completely decimated by the transfer portal this past offseason after their coach and quarterback left for New Mexico, and coach Jason Eck brought in 35 transfers along with 20 high school players, which is a ridiculous amount of roster turnover. And yet they ran UCLA off the field.

Martin Jarmond sold DeShaun Foster as a continuity hire to UCLA fans, one who would keep up the positive momentum of the Chip Kelly era. Now, putting aside your thoughts on whether the Chip Kelly era was worth saving - it wasn’t - those circumstances in and of themselves are not the death knell of a coaching tenure. Consider Brent Key, who took over as an interim coach at his alma mater of Georgia Tech, during the 2022 season. Key went about completely changing the culture that had existed under previous coach Geoff Collins, rebuilding the program in his image as a former offensive line coach. Key’s biggest strength is that he understands who he is, and the Yellowjackets are a reflection of their coach.

Foster was never able to articulate who or what his program was supposed to be. His trademark of D.R.E. - Discipline, Respect, and Enthusiasm - was meant to be a mission statement for the program, but by the end was nothing more than a punching bag. Even as a continuity hire, Foster had the opportunity to leave his imprint on the program and reshape it in his image, but failed spectacularly at doing so. During press conferences, Foster constantly seemed unsure of himself and at a loss as to what was going on; while it was easy to dunk on Foster’s proclamation that UCLA was located in Los Angeles (in the process becoming the first person in history to lose a media days press conference), I will always be stuck on Foster’s constant proclamation that UCLA simply failed to execute in every postgame conference following a loss, a great example of a coach that could not articulate what was happening in the moment.

DeShaun Foster was never able to articulate why he was the right person for this job at this moment, which leads directly to his inability to create interest in the program. On the surface, one might point to Foster’s position as a continuity hire of the failed Chip Kelly era as a problem here, and it certainly was, but Foster had a lot of goodwill built up with the fanbase thanks to his past exploits on the field. I say had, because Foster spent the entirety of his tenure wasting that goodwill at every opportunity. I talked about it during the preseason previews this year, but cutting off media access during the preseason this year was indicative of a program that is uninterested in building an audience. UCLA spent years hemorrhaging fans during the Kelly years, and if Foster had done even the bare minimum to improve fan outreach, he likely would still be the head coach at this moment.

I need to stress that point a bit before moving on. I went back to the first articles we wrote here following the announcement of Foster’s hire, and I was struck by how many people were willing to support Foster despite his lack of qualifications for the job. Even in an article where I laid out exactly what ended up happening, the comments were full of people expressing hope for the future. Despite being a continuation of the Kelly era, Foster had so much goodwill built up that he could have pushed for major changes in areas like NIL; in that same way, Foster’s unwillingness to push for those changes speaks volumes as to why he was the choice over better options present at the time, like Tony White.

Foster’s inability to connect to the fanbase extends beyond the average supporter, as he could not convince influential donors to support him and the program. Again, some blame here should go to athletic director Martin Jarmond, who continues to be a hindrance to UCLA’s NIL situation thanks to his unwillingness to recognize that the House settlement will not lessen the impact of NIL on acquiring talent, but Foster did not do much better when it came to building those relationships either. If anything, Foster managed to be just as much of a hindrance to UCLA’s NIL efforts as Jarmond; Foster had a falling out with UCLA’s established collective in Men of Westwood and made a move to get a new football-only collective set up called Bruins for Life. The move initially looked unfavorable and has only worsened over time, as UCLA’s NIL operation in football ranks near the bottom of the Big Ten in terms of available funds.

The job of a college football head coach is an incredibly difficult one. The head coach is the leader of the team on the field, ultimately responsible for the results each week, but they also have many job obligations outside of that. As mentioned, the talent acquisition strategy is set by the head coach. The head coach is in many ways the biggest point of contact regarding public relations for their team, having to shmooze donors and sell their program as viable to the masses. They don’t work alone at this, but it is a core part of the responsibility of a coach in the modern era. No coach can ignore this; even Nick Saban still did his radio show once a week and knew when it was important to shake a hand and take a picture.

DeShaun Foster did not seem to get that aspect of the job, which is understandable since his biggest mentor quit rather than take that aspect seriously. And at the end of the day, it does not matter that Foster was dealt a poor hand, because he failed so spectacularly at the parts of the job that were under his control. The only surprising part is that UCLA was willing to admit its mistake this quickly.

Final Composite

Offense grade: F (0.0)

Defense grade: F (0.0)

Special Teams grade: C (2.0)

Coaching grade: F (0.0)

Trending: Down

Final grade for New Mexico Lobos: F (0.0)

And here is how the grades have looked this season:

Utah Utes: D- (0.6)

UNLV Rebels: D- (0.6)

The Tim Skipper era will only last for nine games, after which UCLA will turn its attention towards a new coach. Already, UCLA has named the members of its search committee, and based on the members listed, including Adam Peters (current GM of the Washington Commanders), Bob Myers (former Golden State GM), and Casey Wasserman, I have a feeling that Martin Jarmond will not have much input on UCLA’s next coach despite the press release stating he is in charge.

In either case, one sad chapter of UCLA football is now complete. Onwards and upwards.

Go Bruins.

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